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Workplace Choice, Commuting Costs, and Wage Taxation in 
Urban and Adjacent Rural Regions  
Abstract 
 We analyze the impact of wage taxation on the workplace choices of and the commuting 
costs borne by individuals in an aggregate economy consisting of an urban and an adjacent rural 
region. This economy is inhabited by a continuum of individuals who are uniformly distributed 
with a total mass of one. These individuals choose whether to work in the urban or in the rural 
region. The wage is higher (lower) in the urban (rural) region. Our analysis leads to three findings. 
First, assuming that individuals work in the region in which their after-tax wage net of commuting 
costs is the highest, we compute the equilibrium number of workers in each region. Second, 
supposing that the rural region’s median voter works in the urban region, we determine the Nash 
equilibrium in taxes and ask whether either of the two regions ought to tax or to subsidize the 
wage. Finally, assuming that the rural region’s median voter works in the rural region, we solve 
for the Nash equilibrium in taxes and show that optimality calls for the urban and the rural 
governments to subsidize the two wages.  
Keywords: Commuting Cost, Rural Region, Urban Region, Wage Taxation, Workplace Choice 







1.1. Literature review 
The study of urban and rural regions has been pursued by both development economists 
and regional scientists for quite some time. Using the lens of development economics, urban 
regions are generally dynamic, they exhibit relatively rapid economic growth rates, they are 
industrial, and they are frequently technologically advanced. In contrast, rural regions are often 
not as dynamic, they are commonly agricultural, they display slow economic growth rates, and 
they are technologically backward. This viewpoint explains why the early literature in 
development economics---see Lewis (1954), Sen (1966), and Dixit (1970)---was preoccupied with 
the study of the so called dual economy. This notwithstanding, it should be noted that this 
traditional focus on dual development has changed greatly in the past few decades. 
Regional scientists, unlike development economists, have concentrated mainly on urban 
and rural regions in the developed world. Even though they have acknowledged that many rural 
regions in the developed world are primarily agricultural, for the most part, regional scientists have 
not analyzed rural regions as the supplier of resource flows to urban regions in a dual economy 
setting. Instead, Jordan et al. (2014), Hall et al. (2006), and Yamamoto (2008) have drawn 
attention to rural-urban differences in, respectively, education, health, and income. This 
concentration has led regional scientists to address questions concerning the sustainability of rural 
regions as independent beings in the face of ever increasing urbanization and the simultaneous rise 




See Alberto and Glaeser (1995), Bettencourt (2013) and Kourtit et al. (2015) for additional details on this point. 
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literature on the nexuses between so called “leading” and “lagging” regions where, predictably, 
rural regions are often the lagging regions.5  
Recently, researchers interested in the connections between urban and rural regions have 
begun to analyze the fact that many rural region residents choose to work in neighboring urban 
regions and vice versa even though such residents have to bear the attendant commuting costs. 
Matha and Wintr (2009) look at bilateral commuting flows across the border regions of four 
European Union nations and show that commuting time or distance and language differences have 
a significant impact on cross-border commuting. Examining data from India, Sharma and 
Chandrasekhar (2014) point out that rural-urban wage differentials are important push and pull 
factors in the decision to commute to work. Korzhenevych and Jain (2018) focus on the New Delhi 
area in India and note that although urbanization has led to the empowerment of women, it has 
also led to a rise of unsustainable commuting patterns from rural areas. Bosworth and Venhorst 
(2018) point out that rural to urban commuting gives rise to a scenario in which the relative level 
of urban wages outperforms rural wages even in the absence of residential migration. Finally, 
Ferreira et al. (2018) study the Lisbon metropolitan region in Portugal and contend that commuting 
not only affects regional and urban economies but that it also gives rise to significant economic 
and environmental costs.  
1.2. Our objective 
Given this review of the literature, we would now like to emphasize four points. First, even 




Examples of recent contributions to this literature include Batabyal and Nijkamp (2014a, 2014b), Batabyal and Beladi (2015), 
Batabyal (2018), and the many references cited in these four papers. 
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has not explicitly analyzed the idea that there is both a game-theoretic and a political economy 
aspect to commuting stemming from the facts that (i) the governments in urban and rural regions 
can be in competition with each other to attract workers to their region and (ii) these majority 
elected governments seek to maximize net income in their respective regions. Second, the literature 
has recognized—see Beeson et al. (2010)---but not analyzed how wage taxation can influence 
commuting between an urban and a rural region in a political-economy setting. Third, our paper 
breaks new ground in the regional science literature because it is, to the best of our knowledge, the 
first to present a theoretical analysis of the combined impacts of commuting costs and wage 
taxation on workplace choice. Finally, we believe that our “combined impacts” analysis shows 
how the traditional linear city model that has been used frequently by regional scientists and urban 
economists can be expanded in ways that permit researchers to examine the effects of additional 
variables that have traditionally received insufficient attention in the literature.  
Given the first two points in the preceding paragraph, our objective in this paper is to 
analyze the impact of wage taxation on the workplace choices of and the commuting costs borne 
by individuals in an aggregate economy consisting of an urban and an adjacent rural region.6 
Section 2 describes the theoretical framework in which the aggregate economy under study is 
inhabited by a continuum of individuals who are uniformly distributed with a total mass of one. 




It is important to understand that we are interested in studying the workplace choices of individuals in our aggregate economy and 
not their residential location choices. That is why we are focusing on things like commuting costs, wages, and wage taxation 
because we believe that these are some of the key variables that influence workplace choice. There certainly are other variables 
that affect workplace choice but including all such variables in the analysis would render the model intractable. Therefore, we have 
made a judgement call to concentrate on a small number of salient variables. That said, we recognize that if we were interested in 
analyzing the residential location choices of individuals, then it would be necessary to draw on ideas from the fiscal federalism 
literature and, in particular, on the ideas about how the availability of public goods and frequently local public goods can influence 
where individuals choose to live. These issues are related to the now well-known “Tiebout hypothesis.” For a textbook discussion 
of these ideas involving public goods and residential choice, see Hindriks and Myles (2013, chapters 7 and 19). For journal articles 
that concentrate on these same ideas, see Gramlich and Rubinfield (1982), Bayoh et al. (2006), and Leung et al. (2012). 
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higher (lower) in the urban (rural) region. There are ad valorem taxes 𝜏𝑈 and 𝜏𝑅 on the wages that 
are paid to the region in which work is performed. Section 3 assumes that individuals work in the 
region in which their after-tax wage net of commuting cost is the highest and then computes the 
equilibrium number of workers in each region.7 Section 4 supposes that the rural region’s median 
voter works in the urban region, determines the Nash equilibrium in taxes, and then asks whether 
either of the two regions ought to tax or to subsidize the wage. Section 5 assumes that the rural 
region’s median voter works in the rural region, ascertains the Nash equilibrium in taxes, and then 
shows that it is optimal for the urban and the rural region governments to subsidize the two wages. 
Finally, section 6 concludes and then discusses one way in which the analysis contained in this 
paper can be generalized to the case in which there are not just two but 𝑛 > 2 regions in the 
aggregate economy.  
2. The Theoretical Framework 
 Consider a linear aggregate economy that is composed of an urban region denoted by 𝑈 
and an adjacent rural region denoted by 𝑅. As shown in figure 1, the two extreme ends of this  
Figure 1 about here 
linear aggregate economy are given by −1 2⁄  and 1 2,⁄  and the center of the aggregate economy 
is located at 0. The urban region is located to the left of the center of the aggregate economy and 




Note that within the setting of our aggregate economy, we are analyzing the decision about which region to work in and not the 
decision about which region to live in. Put differently, we are studying the “which region to commute to for work” decision. 
Therefore, this decision is not the same as a migration decision which typically involves moving to another region to live there for 
at least some length of time. That said, if we were interested in analyzing the decision to migrate from one region to another region, 
then, following the work of Basile and Lim (2017), we would need to account for the following two findings in our analysis. First, 
the relationship between regional wage differentials and the decision to migrate is often nonlinear. Second, in addition to answering 
the questions “whether to move” and “where to move to,” it is also important to answer the “when to move” question.  
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individuals who are uniformly distributed with a total mass of one. The urban and the rural regions 
in our model have a population of 1 2.⁄   
The median voter in the urban (rural) region is located at −1 4 (1 4).⁄⁄  The place where 
work is performed in the urban (rural) region is located at −1 3 (1 3).⁄⁄  The reader may want to 
think of this place as the central business district (CBD) in each region. Wages in the two regions 
are exogenous. Consistent with existing evidence---see Bucci (1993) and Bosworth and Venhorst 
(2018)---we suppose that the higher urban wage is given by 𝜃 > 1 and that the rural wage equals 
1. There are ad valorem taxes levied on the urban and the rural wages denoted by 𝜏𝑈 and 𝜏𝑅 . The 
proceeds from these two taxes are paid to the region in which work is performed.  
Individuals in our aggregate economy incur a commuting cost that is given by 1 2⁄  per unit 
of distance travelled to one’s chosen workplace. The urban and the rural regions are administered 
by governments that are elected by majorities in the two regions and these governments are 
assumed to maximize net income. Net income is given by the sum of the median voter’s net wage 
and the fiscal revenue per capita.8 In symbols, when the median voter in region 𝑗, 𝑗 = 𝑈, 𝑅 works 
in region 𝑖, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, the net income in region 𝑗 is given by  
𝐼𝑗 = {1 − 𝜏𝑖}𝑤𝑖 + 𝜏𝑗𝑁𝑗𝑤𝑗 ,      (1) 




Since we are interested primarily in the workplace choice question, our analysis focuses on wages, wage taxation, and commuting 
costs. In this way of looking at the research question, consumer expenditures are not of first-order importance and hence can be 
omitted from the analysis. That said, one way of accounting for consumer expenditures would be to subsume them in the commuting 
cost term described below in equation (2). Second, we also do not model “the expenditures of the local governments from the tax 
revenues” because, as shown below in sections 4 and 5, there are several cases in which optimality calls for wage subsidization and 
not taxation and hence, in these cases, there are no tax revenues to spend.  
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commuting costs is the highest and then compute the equilibrium number of workers in each 
region. 
3. Number of Workers in Each Region 
Let us begin by deriving an algebraic expression for 𝑧 where 𝑧 ∈ [− 1 2, 1 2]⁄⁄  is the 
location of the individual who is indifferent between working in either the urban or in the rural 
region. To find an expression for 𝑧, we equate the after-tax wages net of commuting costs to the 
workplaces in each of the two regions, recalling that the locations of the workplaces (the CBDs) 
in the urban and in the rural regions are given by −1 3⁄  and 1 3⁄  respectively. Now, some thought 
tells us that the equation of interest for 𝑧 is  
 {1 − 𝜏𝑈}𝜃 − 12 (𝑧 + 13) = {1 − 𝜏𝑅} − 12 (13 − 𝑧),   (2) 
 
where the left-hand-side (LHS) denotes the after-tax wage net of commuting costs in the urban 
region and the right-hand-side (RHS) denotes the corresponding expression for the rural region. 
Solving equation (2) for the indifferent individual’s location, we get  𝑧 = {1 − 𝜏𝑈}𝜃 − {1 − 𝜏𝑅}.      (3) 
 Using this expression for 𝑧, the number of individuals working in the urban region is given 
by 𝑁𝑈 = 1 2⁄ + 𝑧 and the corresponding expression for the rural region is 𝑁𝑅 = 1 2⁄ − 𝑧. 
Simplifying the preceding two equations further using equation (3), we get 





 𝑁𝑅 = 12 − 𝑧 = 12 − {1 − 𝜏𝑈}𝜃 + {1 − 𝜏𝑅}.    (5) 
 
Inspecting equations (4) and (5), it is straightforward to confirm that the number of 
individuals working in the urban and in the rural regions responds to the two wage taxes in the 
expected manner. Specifically, the number of individuals working in the urban region or 𝑁𝑈 is a 
decreasing function of the urban wage tax 𝜏𝑈 and an increasing function of the rural wage tax 𝜏𝑅 . 
Similarly, the number of individuals who are employed in the rural region or 𝑁𝑅 is a decreasing 
function of the rural wage tax 𝜏𝑅 and an increasing function of the urban wage tax 𝜏𝑈. These two 
findings clearly reveal the interdependent nature of the wage tax policies utilized by the 
governments of the two regions under study.  
We now assume that the median voter in the rural region works in the urban region, 
compute the Nash equilibrium in taxes, and then ask whether the optimal course of action for the 
governments in either of the two regions involves taxing or subsidizing the two wages. 
4. Rural Median Voter Works in the Urban Region 
 Given the structure of our linear aggregate economy model and the expression for the 
indifferent individual’s location in equation (3), it should be clear to the reader that the median 
voter in the rural region will work in the urban region as long as 𝑧 ≥ 1/4. Also, note that when 
this last inequality holds, the median voter in the urban region also works in the urban region. 
Keeping these two points in mind, the government of the urban region maximizes net income or 𝐼𝑈. Modifying equation (1), the relevant expression for 𝐼𝑈 is 𝐼𝑈 = (1 − 𝜏𝑈)𝜃 + 𝜏𝑈𝑁𝑈𝜃,      (6) 
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where 𝑁𝑈 is given by equation (4).  
Now substituting for 𝑁𝑈 from equation (4) into equation (6) and then differentiating the 
resulting expression with respect to the urban wage tax 𝜏𝑈, taking the rural wage tax 𝜏𝑅 as given, 
gives us the first-order necessary condition for an optimum. In symbols, that condition is 
 𝑑𝐼𝑈𝑑𝜏𝑈 = 𝜃2 − 2𝜃 + 𝜃2 − 2𝜃2𝜏𝑈 + 𝜃𝜏𝑅 = 0.    (7) 
 
Simplifying equation (7) gives us the best response wage tax of the government in the urban region. 
That tax is  
 𝜏𝑈 = 𝜃+𝜏𝑅−3 2⁄2𝜃 .       (8) 
 
 The government in the rural region also maximizes net income. Recalling that the median 
voter in the rural region works in the urban region, the expression for the rural region’s net income 
is  𝐼𝑅 = (1 − 𝜏𝑈)𝜃 + 𝜏𝑅𝑁𝑅 ,      (9) 
where 𝑁𝑅 is given by equation (5).  
We can now substitute for 𝑁𝑅 from equation (5) into equation (9) and then differentiate the 
resulting expression with respect to the rural wage tax 𝜏𝑅 , taking the urban wage tax 𝜏𝑈 as given. 
This gives us the first-order necessary condition for an optimum. We get 
 𝑑𝐼𝑅𝑑𝜏𝑅 = 32 − 𝜃 + 𝜃𝜏𝑈 − 2𝜏𝑅 = 0.     (10) 
11 
 
Simplifying equation (10), the best response wage tax levied by the government of the rural region 
is  
 𝜏𝑅 = 𝜃𝜏𝑈−𝜃+3 2⁄2 .       (11) 
 
 Solving equations (8) and (11)---describing the best response wage tax functions in the 
urban and in the rural regions---simultaneously, we obtain the two Nash equilibrium taxes that we 
seek. These are given by 
 𝜏𝑈 = 13 − 12𝜃,        (12) 
 
and 
 𝜏𝑅 = 12 − 𝜃3.        (13) 
 
 Inspecting the two optimal tax expressions in equations (12) and (13) carefully, we see that 
the optimal urban and rural wage tax rates are both equal to zero when 𝜃 = 3 2.⁄  In addition, when 𝜃 < 3 2,⁄  we get 𝜏𝑈 < 0 and 𝜏𝑅 > 0 and, in contrast, when 𝜃 > 3 2⁄ , we obtain 𝜏𝑈 > 0 and 𝜏𝑅<0. 
These findings yield three clear results. First, we see that there exists a threshold value of the urban 
wage 𝜃 such that when the urban wage equals this threshold, it is optimal for the governments in 
both regions to not tax wages at all. Second, when the urban wage is only a little higher (𝜃 < 3 2)⁄  
than the rural wage, it is optimal to subsidize the urban wage and to tax the rural wage. Finally, 
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when the urban wage is much higher (𝜃 > 3 2)⁄  than the rural wage, it makes sense to tax the 
urban wage and to subsidize the rural wage.  
 We have already noted in the first paragraph of this section that the median voter in the 
rural region will work in the urban region as long as 𝑧 ≥ 1/4. Using this inequality in the 
expression for 𝑧 in equation (3) along with equations (12) and (13), we get 
 𝑧 = {1 − 𝜏𝑈}𝜃 − {1 − 𝜏𝑅} ≥ 14 ⇒ 𝜃 ≥ 34    (14) 
 
The weak inequality on the RHS of (14) gives us an explicit restriction on the magnitude 
of the parameter 𝜃 that must hold for the Nash equilibrium in taxes that we have been studying 
thus far in this section to exist. So, when this equilibrium exists, excluding the relatively small 
range where 𝜃 ∈ [3 4, 3 2)⁄⁄ , it is optimal for the urban (rural) region to tax (subsidize) the wage. 
Note that in this last scenario, because the urban region is employing some rural individuals, the 
optimal “tax” action by the urban government that we have just mentioned involves including in 
the urban tax base some people who actually live in the rural region.  
 In our final task in this paper, we first suppose that the rural region’s median voter works 
in the rural region. Next, we ascertain the Nash equilibrium in taxes. Finally, we demonstrate that 
it now makes sense for the urban and the rural governments to subsidize the two wages.  
5. Rural Median Voter Works in the Rural Region  
 When the median voter in the rural region works in the same region, the objective of the 
government in this region---as in the urban region---is to maximize net income which can now be 
expressed as  𝐼𝑅 = (1 − 𝜏𝑅) + 𝜏𝑅𝑁𝑅 ,      (15) 
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and 𝑁𝑅 is given by equation (5).  
Substituting for 𝑁𝑅 from equation (5) into equation (15) and then differentiating the 
resulting expression with respect to the rural wage tax 𝜏𝑅 gives us the first-order necessary 
condition for an optimum. In symbols, the condition we seek is 
 𝑑𝐼𝑅𝑑𝜏𝑅 = 12 − 𝜃 + 𝜃𝜏𝑈 − 2𝜏𝑅 = 0.     (16) 
 
Simplifying equation (16) gives us the best response wage tax of the government in the rural 
region. That tax is  
 𝜏𝑅 = 𝜃𝜏𝑈−𝜃+1 2⁄2 .       (17) 
 
 To continue the analysis, suppose that the urban median voter works in the urban region. 
Then we can solve equations (8) and (17) simultaneously to determine the two optimal taxes. After 
a few steps of algebra, the Nash equilibrium taxes are given by  
 𝜏𝑈 = 13 − 56𝜃,        (18) 
 
and 




Inspecting equation (19), it is clear that the optimal rural tax is, in fact, a subsidy for all 
positive values of the parameter 𝜃. If the rural median voter is to work in the rural region then this 
“subsidy” result must hold because the net wage in the rural region is lower than the net wage in 
the urban region.  
The Nash equilibrium that we have been studying thus far in this section exists as long as 
the location of the indifferent individual in our aggregate economy satisfies the condition 
 − 14 < 𝑧 < 14.        (20) 
 
Recall that 𝑧 in (20) is given by equation (3). Therefore, substituting the values of 𝜏𝑈 and 𝜏𝑅 from 
equations (18) and (19) into (20) and then simplifying the resulting expression gives us an explicit 
condition that 𝜃 must satisfy in order for the Nash equilibrium of this section to exist. That 
condition is  
 14 < 𝜃 < 74.        (21) 
 
If 𝜃 must satisfy the condition given in (21) then looking at this range of values of 𝜃 in the 
context of the optimal urban wage tax given in equation (18), it should be clear to the reader that 
the optimal urban tax is also a subsidy. In other words, to get the urban median voter to work in 
the urban region, the government of this region also subsidizes the wage. In sum, if the urban and 
the rural median voters are to work in their respective regions then the optimal policy for the 
governments in these two regions is not to tax but instead to subsidize the two wages.  
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In this and in the preceding section, we have identified a number of cases in which it is 
optimal for the government to subsidize and not tax wages. We emphasize that this central policy 
conclusion which tells us that there are circumstances in which it makes sense for governments to 
subsidize wages is not just a “theoretical option.” In fact, this policy conclusion tells us that in the 
presence of interregional commuting for work, a regional government can often best compete for 
workers with its neighboring regional government by boosting or subsidizing wages in its own 
jurisdiction.  
That said, the reader should note that wage subsidies have been used by many governments 
in a variety of circumstances. In this regard, a general argument for using wage subsidies in the 
United States has been made by Cass (2018) who points out that subsidizing wages is a well-
tailored response to the challenges that globalization presents for American workers and that such 
subsidies help sustain communities that lose their tradable sector. A recent United States 
government document9 points out that states can use welfare grants as a source of wage subsidies 
for participants placed in jobs and that such subsidies have the potential to increase employment 
opportunities. Finally, Almeida et al. (2014) discuss the many practical instances in which wage 
subsidies have been used throughout the world. Here are three examples. One wage subsidy 
program used in the United States in the past is the “New Jobs Tax Credit” of the 1970s. In 1998, 
the United Kingdom enacted a targeted wage subsidy program called the “New Deal for Young 
People” for people in the 18-24 age group. Finally, in Sweden, a particular program provided 
employer subsidies of up to 50 percent of earnings for firms that hired individuals who have been 




For more details, go to https://aspe.hhs.gov/report/reworking-welfare-technical-assistance-states-and-localities/30-work-





In addition to the central policy conclusion mentioned above, there are two other policy 
conclusions emanating from our analysis that deserve some comment. First and looking only at 
the “number of workers” metric, a regional government that is engaged in strategic competition 
with a neighboring regional government can best attract workers to its own region by maintaining 
a low wage tax environment. Second, there exists a scenario in which the regional government in 
one region (the urban region) can shift a part of the tax base onto individuals who are resident in 
the second (rural) region. This can be done when the first (urban) region government is successful 
in getting workers from the second (rural) region to come work in its region. This completes our 
discussion of workplace choice, commuting costs, and wage taxation in urban and adjacent rural 
regions.  
6. Conclusions 
 In this paper, we studied the impact of wage taxation on the workplace choices of and the 
commuting costs borne by individuals in an aggregate economy consisting of an urban and an 
adjacent rural region. This aggregate economy was inhabited by a continuum of individuals who 
were uniformly distributed with a total mass of one. These individuals chose whether to work in 
the urban or in the rural region. The wage was higher (lower) in the urban (rural) region. Our 
analysis led to three results. First, assuming that individuals worked in the region in which their 
after-tax wage net of commuting costs was the highest, we computed the equilibrium number of 
workers in each region. Second, on the assumption that the rural region’s median voter worked in 
the urban region, we determined the Nash equilibrium in taxes and then asked whether either of 
the two regions ought to tax or to subsidize the wage. Finally, supposing that the rural region’s 
 
As pointed out in section 1.2, our objectives in this paper explain why we have concentrated on wage taxes and subsidies in 
considerable detail. Depending on the question being analyzed, it is certainly possible that the government in one or both regions 
may use different policy instruments such as the provision of high quality schools and/or property taxes to attract potential residents. 
Clearly, in our paper, the question of providing high quality schools does not arise because we are analyzing workplace choice and 
not residential choice. 
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median voter worked in the rural region, we solved for the Nash equilibrium in taxes and then 
showed that it was optimal for the urban and the rural governments to subsidize the two wages.  
 We now outline one way in which the analysis contained in this paper can be generalized 
to study questions similar to those studied here but with the additional feature that there are 𝑛 > 2 
regions in the aggregate economy. To this end, consider an aggregate economy in which there are 𝑛 > 2 regions that are competing among themselves to attract workers. Each region is endowed 
with one unit of capital (𝐾) and this capital is immobile across the 𝑛 regions. The aggregate 
economy also contains one unit of labor (𝐿) that is mobile across the different regions. We suppose 
that all regions produce a final good (𝑄) with a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production 
given by 𝑄 = 𝐹(𝐾, 𝐿) = 𝐾3/4𝐿1/4. For convenience, the price of this final good is fixed at $1.  
 In the above setting, we would begin our analysis by studying the benchmark case in which 
no region taxes either capital or labor, in two steps. In the first step, we would focus on labor---
although we could focus on capital as well---and then determine the equilibrium wage rate and the 
allocation of labor across the 𝑛 regions. In the second step, we would determine how the 
equilibrium wage and the total income of workers responds to changes in, for instance, the actual 
number of regions or 𝑛. The point of this second step would be to examine the nature of the 
functional relationship between the equilibrium wage rate and the size of the aggregate economy. 
 Next, moving away from the benchmark case, we would study the effects of differential 
taxation of labor income by the regions in the model. To this end, suppose region 1 taxes labor 
income at rate 𝜏1 and that the remaining 𝑛 − 1 regions do not tax labor income. Again, to keep 
matters straightforward, suppose that the tax revenue is used by the government in region 1 to buy 
more output of the final good at the fixed price $1. Questions of interest now include the following 
18 
 
four. First, is there a scenario in which the tax imposed by region 1 is, in fact, not a tax but a 
subsidy? Second, if such a scenario does not exist then what is the after-tax return to labor in region 
1? Third, what is the new or after-tax equilibrium wage rate and the allocation of labor across the 𝑛 regions? Finally, from a comparative statics standpoint, what is the total income of workers and 
the tax revenue in region 1 and how sensitive are these two metrics to changes in, for instance, the 
number of regions 𝑛 and the tax rate 𝜏1? Studies that analyze these aspects of the underlying 
problem will increase our understanding of the nexuses between wage taxation on the one hand 
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